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Abstract: The notion of indi \'idual responsihility is even in o ur current era of 
instirutional and corporate decisions and enterprises of much import and of 
pa1ticubr impo11ann: for technology. However. problerns of collective :ind 
corroratc resronsibility :1re becoming ancl still will become more and more 
topical. Engineering ethics cmles should he cle veloped. improved and opera-
tionallv imrlemented in the future. The rules sketched out here of priorities 
for handling responsibility cunflicts have subsequently to be e bhoratcd much 
further. Ali this. then. would he necessa1y to meet the ideal requirements of 
our joint ami individual resronsihility for technology in our society. 
Resumen: En nuestra actual era de empresas y decisiones corporativa~ e ins-
titucionaks, la noción de responsabilidad individual l'S dl' gran significado y 
de particul:t r importancia para la tecn ología. No obstante. los problemas de la 
responsabi lidad colecti\·a y corporativa se tornan, y se tornarán cada vez. más 
actuales y dedsivos. Los códigos éiicos de la ingeniería deberían, pues. desa-
rrollarse. mejorarse y hacerse efectivos ope rativamente en el futuro. Por eso, 
las reglas esbozadas aquí sobre prioridades para el manejo de los cont1ictos 
de respon~abilidad han de ser elaboradas con mucho más detalle. Todo ello 
sería nen:~ario. por tanto. p:tra encontrar los requisitos ideales de nuestra res-
ponsab ilidad ind i\'idual y colecti\·:i respecto de la tecnología en nuestrn sode-
tlatl. 
PROBLE:O.IS OF H ESl'O'.\SIBILITY 1'.'\ A:-.ID FOR TECH t\01.0GY 
Economics and Engineering are diffcrent fields. Do the ethics 
questions as a conscquence differ between tbem? Moral judgements 
ancl ethical problems with respect to technology cmd economy are 
usually problems of bearing, attributing and distributing responsihility. 
\'í/e can understand man or woman as the normative being which 
means rhat he or she is morally disringuishecl from othe r creatures by 
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the capaciry to bcar, acknowledge, consciously identify and accept res-
ponsibilities for thc outcome of his or her actions and role fulfilments. 
Humans are so to speak the moral heings. Yet, moral responsibility is 
hut eme sort o f rcsponsibility which might he located within a rather 
cornplex realm of different responsibilities, e.g. engendered by con-
tracts or sorne other mutual agrecments which might not necessarily 
he moral in the narrower sense, i.e., that they might noc affect the life, 
limhs, psyche, and well-heing of other people or living heings in gene-
ra l. These erhically speaking not morally relevant responsihilities might 
be called ethically neutral. But they are still normative and prímafacie 
to he abided by the respective persons who have taken over these 
non-moral rcsponsibiliries. In ad<lirion, rhese ethically neutral respon-
sihilities might get into conflict with moral duties and ethically relevant 
ohligations, i.e. moral duties in the narrower sense. Shoukl a manager 
jusr follow up \Vith managerial and economic strategies of maximizing 
profit or pressing for time in risky operations and strategies of imple-
mentation of a new technology or so? Or shoul<l he refrain from any 
risk for lives ami lirnbs of other people in acceding to operational 
plans of implementation of a new recbnology? Is safety ro be valuecl 
first - even despite sorne set-hacks with respect to economic develop-
ment ami a possible maximization of gains or profits? Should for ins-
tance an engineer \vho is employed in a dependent position. in case 
of a risky decision to occur "blow the whistle .. - as the respective 
metaphor reads - and give a warning information to the public ab out 
the expected risks or hazards or negative potential outcomes? Should 
loyalry to his firm or supervisors or the taking into consi<leration of his 
personal career within the firm override his moral responsibility or 
coresponsibility for the safety of the puhlic? Or has moral responsibi-
lity to take prccedence over tbc responsibil ity of contractual kincls alr-
hough even the abiding by contracrs ccrtainly also has a moral hue to 
ir or even a moral dimension insofar. e .g., as we are also morally o bli-
ged to ahi<le hy the law. There is also a question whcther or not moral 
responsihil ities occurring in economy and tcchnology are ident ical o r 
overlapping or mayhe ar strains with one another. An affirmative ans-
wer would amount then to the thesis that ethics in econorny and moral 
judgements in technology could be at times in conflict with one anot-
ber o r at least diverge within some region of overlap. Indeed, o ne 
coukl well argue that ethical problems in economy are further-rea-
ching than moral problems in technology, hecause there are many pro-
blems in the economic management ami distribution o f jobs etc. wh ich 
are not <lirectly relevant for or intluenced by technological factors. 
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However, basically then: is a large overlap hetween the two fiekls, and 
as far as technology is involved ami technological implernentation at 
stake witbin economic decision-making. the prohlems of ethical rele-
vance of both fields are pretty much the same or at least narrowly con-
nectecl w ith one another «:f. Lenk/Maring 1995a). 
It seems, howe,·e r, th:ll with respect to thc question of safety 
managers somctimes would ignore this rdatedness. Tbis rnight drama-
rically be llighlighted by the analysis of the catastrophe of the US spa-
cecraft Cballe11ger in 1986. when 73 seconds afrer take-off from Cape 
Canaveral the manned spaceship exploded and seven astronauts lost 
their lives. A direct cause was a hrittle sealing ring of rubber which 
according to expectation and warn ings of the engineers from the roc-
ket producer firm Morton Thiokol hroke under the conditions of low 
remperature below free7.ing point. One <lay befare take-off the engi-
neers. most notably Allen MacDonald, the project leader. and Roger 
Roisjoly. the ve1y expert for sealing rings in rocketry, hacl warned and 
protested against take-off plans for tbe next day. They informed NASA 
about the clanger tliat the sealing rings would break below freezing 
point. They werc :1ssisted by the cleputy director of the engineering 
department of the rocketry firm, Rohert Lund, who also infonned Jerry 
Mason. a superordinate engineer within the same firm. Mason howe-
ver silcnced Lund and finished the debate by saying, ''Take off your 
enginecring hat and pul on your management hat''. Lund gave in and 
gave his consent to the take-off which he notifiecl to the project leader 
of NASA \vho okayed the take-off without mentioning any douhts. The 
catastrophic acciclent ensued. (Later on the engineers who hacl laun-
ched the warnings, MacDonald and Boisjoly, were - even after the 
accident - transferrecl to another department which they cleemccl a 
kind of quasi-punishment after the fact.) 
Do indeed managers decide differently from engineers? b this a 
case \Vhere apparently ethical aspects of decision-making and factual 
judging diverge for the e thics of technology and economics? Are the 
management hat ancl the engineering hat indeed different hats - in 
ethical respects? 
In any case, the example shows immediately how intriguing the 
prohlems of responsihility and its interpretation as well as its distribu-
tion are: \Xlho was the responsihle one in this case? Eve1yhody who 
had heen involved? Just NASA, not one inclividually? Each to a certa in 
degree? Hmv much, then? (Cf. helow to the questions of clisu'ihuting 
responsihility.) Let us turn first to questions of responsibility in gene-
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ral, especially to the prohlems of definition and delincation of respon-
sivbility and specifí c: responsibilities. 
1. Respo11sihi/iZ1' as Relatio11al Concept 
"Responsihility" is not just a conc:ept sole ly to be usecl descripti-
n:ly - somcone is responsihle - hut also above all an evaluative attri-
hurive concept - somehody is hekl to he responsihle. It is thís attribu-
tion which opens the normative. even ethical dimension of action in a 
stricrer sense. The concept of responsihility itself is a diverse concept 
of structure or rclat ion thar is linked to assignment, attribution and 
imputation, a scheme thac needs to he analysed and interpreted with 
respect to the following elcments: 
someo11e-. the suhject or hearer of responsibility (a person ora corpo-
ration) 
is 
re.,j)()nsihle 
for: somethill/!, (actions, consequences of actions, situations, tasks. etc.) 
in t'ie1v qf an ad.dressee ("object" of responsibility) 
u11der supen.lisüm orjudgeme11t qf a juclging or sanctioning i11stance 
in relation to: a (prescriprive, normative) criterimz of accountahili~~, 
if'ithi11: a ,,pecific realm of resp011sihiliz)' ancl action. 
Responsibiliry is firstly a concept that figures within a relational attri-
butive nonn (controlled expectation of action ami hehaviour). 
Responsibility means that a pe rson must justify actions, consequences 
of actions, s ituations, tasks, etc. in fronc of an addressee and hefore an 
instance of justification, hoth not heing necessarily identical \Vith one 
another, to whom he or she has obligations or duties of rendering jus-
tification, in accordancc w ith standards, criteria, norms, etc. The res-
ponsible person is accountahle for bis or her own actions, or under 
specific conditions also for actions performed by others for whom he 
or she is vicariously responsible. (Parents, for exarnple, are liable for 
their young children far a certain wrong conduct by these. maybe in 
che sense of the violarion of their superviso1y duty.) The concept of 
responsihiliry would give structure to the social reality (of norrns anc\ 
actions) and to social relations. One can differentíate between the typi-
cal hearers of responsibility in tenns of active roles and ohserver roles. 
One imputes or attributes a specific responsibility to oneself as a n 
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actor or to others from the perspective of participant, observer or 
scientist, in relation to rules and norms that apply beyond the indivi-
dual. The attrihution (in a pa11icular case) activates, rhat is, instantia-
tes. the general pattern of responsibility in a specific instance. 
Imputation of responsibility lies as much in self-interpretation as in the 
interpretation of the actions of orhers. 
Responsihility is therefore attributed or imputed: on the one hand 
one establishes from the perspective of ohservatiou that somebody (A) 
is responsihle, causally or according to a criterion, for an action (for 
acting or refraining from actio n), for the consequences of an action, or 
for the occurrence of an event. On the other hancl, the actor (A) can 
also be made responsible. This attrihution can thus be understood eit-
her descriptively or normatively; it is descriptive or normative. Both 
can be differemiatecl by a careful analysis, even if in effect both attri-
butions are often consiclered simultaneously. 
The discussion about the attribution of responsibility shows that 
the distinction between the descriptive and normative attitude and a 
descriptive or nonnative assumption of the attribution or imputation, 
respectively, has thus fa r not heen sufficiently taken into consideration. 
A necessa1y condition of the descriptive attrihution (to describe A as 
responsible for X) and of the normative attribute (to make A respon-
sihle for X) is that the (intentional) actor (A) is the causal agent, or is 
at least capable of intervening in the causal chain that leacls to X. An 
evaluation of A can be made. with references to (normative) criteria; it 
is indeed only according to a criterion that the bearer of responsibility 
can or could be held responsible. The origin of the descriptive con-
ce pt of responsibility also, as closer analysis will show, can he traced 
back to the normative one, i.e., to social and conventional normatiza-
tion or to a requirement established by an authority. 
As one distinguishes between a general responsibility for the 
results of an action from a kind of role-responsihility and task-respon-
sihility, and from the purview of legal and moral responsibility, a 
second aspect of interpretation becomes clear: the responsibility for 
the result of an action is at first just seen as a superordinate, schema-
tic, formal categorization; it must be related , through the contextual 
specifications of tasks or roles or tbrough (universal) moral or legal 
interpretation, to the appropriate realm of substantial values and 
norms. Only then can its content and sense be comprehensible. 
Distinct types of responsibility would render structure to the 
social, that is, the normative, reality in different ways. They have spe-
54 HA NS LENK Y 1\IATl'tllAS MAIUNG 
cifi c structural implications1. Conceptual instruments of analysis such 
as institut ionalized normative rules and critcria of (types of) n:sponsi-
bility also may structure rhe concrete responsihility attributions and 
thcir consequences. Tbus, specific and more concrete expectations 
and demands follow from the relevant applications of the various types 
of responsihility. Certain tasks and duties, for example, are tied to a 
role that relates exclusively to the role-hearer, and are not so person-
oriented as, e.g., in the cases of an activated moral responsihility. 
2. D{/lerent Ana~vtic TJ11es of Re.,ponsihilizy 
The most ohvious ami general leve! of how to describe responsí-
bilities is referring to one's bcing responsihle for the results and con-
sequences of one's own actions. \Y./e may call this type che action res-
p cmsihili(v (see Fig. 1 ): 
Action responsibility <Fig. 1) 
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1 Stnicmral implication~ in this contexr meaning stnicturally produced, that is, 
asstllnt::d or impli<:d (analytic) consequences of the h:isic therny or ronrept. 
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An agent is ro he held responsihle for the outcornes of his or her 
actions by an ínstance to which (s)he is accountable. An engineer 
desighing a bridge or a dam is responsible to the supervisor, ernplo-
yer, client and/or the public for the respective design in terms of tech-
nical correctness, safety, cost, feasibility etc. Frequently, accountability 
questions are raised in examplary negative cases, by failing in one or 
sorne of rhese respects. The breaking of a dam may be due to false 
statical computation or to careless, negligent or even cheating work or 
poor crafrsmanship or using cheap material. Therefore, it is important 
to emphasize negative acrion responsibility in the form of responsibi-
lity of prevention - and at times of prese1vation respectively. 
Professionals, e.g., have the responsibility to the puhlic to ensure high 
standards in their work and to avoid risks of disasters as far as possi-
hle at a reasonable cost. The responsibility to avoid mistakes, failures, 
pu re quality of work etc. is part and parce! of causal responsibility hut 
also an instance of the respective roles and task responsibility to be 
mentioned later. A negative causal responsihility would analytically be 
directed al avoiding careless omissions. 
There is an active responsibility for taking the initiative actively ro 
search for potential sources of dangers and risks which can he called 
prevention(-oriented) responsibility. The engineer in charge of quality 
control has systematically to search for technical weaknesses. In his 
case, the prevention responsibility becomes part of his role responsi-
bility formally connected with his job activity. From the action res-
ponsibility in the narrower individual (act utilitarian) sense we have to 
distinguish the general responsibility for longer ranging activity pat-
te rns. (E.g., as a parent one is not only responsible for individual 
actions and their consequences with respect to one's children but in a 
much more comprehensive manner encompassing many possible 
act ions as well as omissions.) 
Very ofren, we have institutions or corporations acting collectively. 
Therefore, there is a responsibility of institutional or corporate actions: 
It may coincide, though not be identical, with the individual responsi-
bility of a person being in a representative position (the representing 
actor be it in an individual group or a institution or corporation). 
Leadership responsibility with respect to outside addressees and ins-
tances are but one example of this kind of responsibility. 
The most usual case of responsibility dealt with so far is indivi-
dua! action responsibility. But if a group is acting collectively or indi-
viduals participate in a joinr group action, tbere is the co-responsibility 
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of partaking members, of the co-actors, so to speak. The responsihility 
for group actions is sometimes called collective or group responsibility 
(Ladd) (cf. helow ). 
Action responsibility would still reside on the most general leve! 
of ahstraction. lt has still to be substantiated by content, be it by role 
ascription/description, legal, or moral considerations. 
Therefore, the second leve! is comprised of the types of rule and 
task respcmsihifi~r (see Fig. 2): 
Role and Task Responsihility (Fig. 2) 
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(lt does not seem necessary to give ex;.imples here, since every-
body takes over ami fulfíls roles and tasks assigned to him or her or 
chosen by oneself.) In taking over ami fulfilling a role ora task (e.g. 
in a job) a role-holder usually bears a n::sponsihility for (normal, i.e. 
acceptabk, or optimum) role-fulfilrnent. These role duties might he 
assignecl in a formal way or be more or less informal. They can even 
be legally ascrihed or at least be legally relevant. If the role-taker is a 
representative in corporare or institutional role patterns his responsihi-
lity may he connected wirh rhe respective institutional role responsibi-
lities (e.g. in leadership). A role Clike that of a parent) might comprise 
the responsihility for a depenclent's well-being, i.e. a caring responsi-
bility (\vhich is a rather interesting type for the moral point of view). 
I3esi<le general role responsihilities we encounter also responsibi-
liries correlated just with specific tasks, he these derived from a role 
pattem or not. Loyalty ro a person or institution need not he connec-
te<l wirh a particular role. Therefore, a loyalty responsibility is to be 
dealt with on different terms. It may come in the form of a caring res-
ponsibility, too. 
In addition, \ve llave the corporate responsibility of institutions or 
corporations, if these have a special task or obligation to perform with 
respect to clients, the public or members o f the organizations etc. This 
rype of responsibility can he of legal, moral or neutrally organizational 
character. There may again he a coinciclence with a group responsihi-
lity (of a group heing in charge of the institution or corporation). Role-
holders and institutions or corporations might be held liahle in terms 
of legal, moral or social qualifications - e.g., with respect to social con-
trol for the latter. The liability might be an accountability to incur 
punishment or to pay an inclemnification or to reinstate a former con-
dition. 
The third leve! of responsihility consists of types of wzi1·ersal 
111ural responsihilíty (see Fig. 3F. At first, then, we have tbe direct 
moral responsibility for rhe agent's acts and results of bis or her acting 
as activated by the action situation. This responsibility is directed 
tO\va rcl persons or living beings whose well-being (life and limh as 
well as psychical and emotional state) is a ffected hy the agent"s acti-
vity. CThe moral point of view is always conceived in terms of the 
! To be surc. :1 fou11h ll'vd of rcsponsihiliry typcs \\·oultl have to cover a tl ia -
g1~11111nc of the varianb of legal rcsponsihihty induding their rclationsh1p to legal liahility 
ami guilt. A fi fth type of n.:sponsihility is rhc rehgious rcsponsihility of the faithful. 
58 HANS l.ENK Y '.\1A'ITHl:\S MAIUNG 
affectedness of persons/ living beings. Usually ic refers to other people, 
hut it may also pertain to oneself - self-responsihility - orto other living 
beings affected by the agenc's activity.) More remote consequences of 
the agent's activity - possibly combined with che impacts of other peo-
ple's accions or omissions - mighc amounc to an indirect moral Ceo-)res-
ponsibility. Negleccing of safecy check ora wrong approval-scamp on 
airpbnes rnight result in loss of lives - as had actually occurred in the 
DC-10 case of the 1974 Paris crash of a Turkish airliner; in 1972 three 
inspeccors of the OC-Long Beach p lant had wrongly approved modifi-
cations of the facally dangerous cargo door locking system without any 
work on che cargo doors actually having been done. A similar case was 
the fouled approval of air brake cescing of the prototype in che 
Goodrich case. More complex problems of indirect co-responsihilities 
are raised with the mencio ned problems of synergetic and cumulative 
threshold effects below within interacting systems, e.g., in pollution or 
deplecion problems. 
Universal Moral Rcsponsihility <Fig. 3) 
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As came out r:ither recently. heside legal rcsponsihilities. corpo-
rations seem also to be:ir moral respo nsihilities (pa1ticularly if they 
don't want to imprnve dangerous conditions as, e.g .. the management 
of Convair in the DC-10 case <Eddy/Potter/Page 1976) or the Air New 
Zealand in the case of the nash on the An tarctic Mount Erebus (French 
1984, Ch. XI) ). This is certainly a type of moral responsihility different 
from an individual's moral accountability. 
The corporate moral responsihility frequently coincides. hut need 
not he identi<:al with the moral corespons ibility of members of a deci-
sion-making board. Corporate moral responsibility therefore is analyti-
cally not to be confounded with moral coresponsihility of group mem-
bers panaking in a collective action or decision-making process (cf. 
below ). 
Caring responsibility certainly is not only role-hound hut also 
morally relevant. Tt is the responsihility to take care for the well-being 
of a dependen! person or living being jusr by specific ac:ts hut in a 
genera l permanent obligation. 
In Engineering Ethic:s Codes - as in many other Codes of Science 
Associations - the responsibility far the safety, health and welfare of 
the public is st ressed - even considered to be of '·paramounr" impor-
tance (cf. e.g. IEEE). This responsihility, a combination of indirect 
moral responsihilities as mentioned above ancl of the obligation to 
ahide by the Ethics Code of the respective p rofessional sociery, is cer-
tainly also a nzoral ohligation, though cm a higher or seconclary leve!. 
Resides immediate action- or impac:t-oriented responsibilities 
there is also a higher-level moral responsibility to keep and fulfil con-
tractual or role duties and promises, to live up to ethics cocles of pro-
fessional soc:ieties, etc. This ohligation is c:ertainly a universal moral 
one, if the fulfilment of a task, contraer or role does not contraclict 
another overriding moral norm. 
In general, thus, we have a rather differentiated interplay of levels 
and rypes of responsibilities, the moral obligations heing hut one spec-
trum. Moral responsihility may he activated by a special type of action 
and in c:onnection with a special role, bu t it is rather universal. Ir is not 
peculiar to a spec:ilk person or role but would apply to everyone 
being in the same situation and/or role. Morality and moral responsi-
b il ity are universal. Moral responsibility is individualized in that sense 
rhat it c:annot be delegatecl, substituted, deplaced or replaced or sho-
vecl off from the respective person (or corporation/institution). It can-
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not be diminished, divicled up, dissolve or vanish by being borne by 
a nurnber of peoplt:. Ir is irreplaceable and undiminishable in that 
sense . 
. ). Problems q/Distrihutinu Responsihili~v 
There is a nice illustrating case in the literature on collective res-
ponsihility. "'A vicar had accumulated a remarkable amount of accom-
plishments for a hamlet of wine-growers. The wine-growers decided 
therefore to donate a harre! of wine to him celebrating the thankful-
ness cm a special occasion. Each wine-grower should contribute two 
litres of bis best wine from his cellar. Consequently, everyone of these 
poured the two litres they had agreed on into the open barrel. 
On the occasion of the respective celebration and after solemn 
speeches the barre! was openec.I and the first glass presented to the 
vicar. But the glass contained but pure water, and the festive mood 
changed to general shamefulness" (Jühr 1976, 127). 
It is not known 'vhether the event mentioned in this example did 
really take place, but it is a very nice illustration of the problem of dis-
tributing responsibility. The example shows immediately how intri-
guing the problems of responsibility ami its distribution are: Who is 
responsible in this case? Evetybocly? Not eme indiviclually? Each to a 
certain degree? 
Prohlems of distributing responsihility are to he found today in 
particular in highly developed industrial societies shape<l by techno-
logy and advanced economies. Personal acting seems to disappear 
behind collective, institutional and/or group actions. Group and 
collective action is on the one hand the acting of and the acting w i-
thin organizations (corporate acting) and on the other hand the actio n 
of many actors under strategic ancl competitive conditions; sometimes 
the actors are rather independent of une another. With respect to 
collective actions there are at least two classes of distribution pro-
blems or rather distributability problems (which may however over-
lap): l. the problem of attrihuting responsibility in the case of non-
corporate collective actions of many actors (he they corporations or 
individuals) and with respect to dynamic processes and development 
of the market and 2. the problem of attributing ami distrihuting res-
ponsibility within the organization with respect to interna! corporate 
segregation of work and role assignment as well as with respect to the 
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corporate division of lahour and procluction (cf. Lenk/Maring 1995b). 
Tnday ami in the near future these problems are hecoming extremely 
rdevant anc.I pressing. This is true. to he su re, not only beca use of the 
impact of new systems-technological phenomena anc.I processes on 
their own, but due also to the high social interconnectiveness o f 
act ion systems, marke ts and the eve rgrowing worldwide interrclatecl-
ness of societies in general. 
Questions of c.listributing collective ancl corporate responsihility 
can he distinguished ancl analysed according to the following approa-
cbes: 
1. rdations and mutual dependence o f agents and legal rules. 
2. models of moral responsihil ity distribution. 
:). responsibility and non-corporate actions, 
·1. responsibility and corporate (institutional) actions and 
5. responsihility anc.1 ( information) systems. 
3. 1 In the philosophical literature the problems of complex 
groups of interrelated agents causing the rdevant actions and uutco-
mes ami questions of responsihility are usually dealt with unrelatedly 
hut very glohally. whereas in jurispruc.lence the problems are dea lt 
w ith in more detail and some interesting appmaches to solutions are 
attained <which apply to philosophy as \ve!!). By way of summarizing 
\\'e might say that the actually convincing principie of attrihuting the 
responsihility to extant agent is running into sorne c.lifficulties. These 
result from the divers and diverse forms of collective action ami the 
non-inc.lividualizahility of the causal integration witbin or with respect 
to synergetic and cumulative processes. Legal rules (de lef!.e lata) typi-
cally foil short of consiclering ecological damages and damages that 
occur far from the sources of ernissions ancl in regard to an ac.lequate 
provision. The need for legal regulations is he ing w idely recognized. 
Such copies as joint and total liahility, including a murual right to com-
pensation. with recourse to the respective development of spheres of 
danger, (str íct) product ami danger liahility that is indepenc.lem of fault, 
the turnabout of the hure.len of prnof, high prohahility of the extant 
causal agency, compensation out of capital funds, incentives to inter-
nalize externalities. etc., are heing c.lisrnssec.I and proposed in the lite-
rature . Prime difficulties of legal solutions certainly lie in the non-lia-
b ility of permitted actions in subliminal individual contributions and in 
the clefinition anc.I establishment of limiting ancl threshold values. (The 
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n.:kvance of k:gal considerations for philosophical discussion s houkl 
be carefu lly testecl.) 
3.2 Cases in which somebocly fully and exclusively has to take 
the responsibility are t:xamined in philosophy as a rule. But are there 
nol also other cases of co-operative n:sponsihility. collective/ co-ope-
rative decisions, and collective action in gent:ral, that are ga ining much 
mort: importance today, in which someone carries full responsibility 
by sharing responsibility, according to the degree of the individual co-
operation or accountability? In other words. cloes the extent of the di.s-
trihution of responsibility gencra lly reduce the degree of moral res-
ponsihility? 
As :i provisional thesis, the following insight should be emphasi-
zt:d in regard to this problem: the centre of the model of the distri-
hution of rcsponsibility is the question of the distribution of normati-
, .e and descriptive responsihility - accorcling to a theory of action - and 
the (equivalentl reduction of the collective responsibility to individual 
actors. \Vhich is dependen! on the form of collectivc actions and cau-
ses; the respective form of collective action is also decisive and 
should, in the following, constitute a criterion for the clistinction of 
various ways of attribut ing responsihility. A further point of emphasis 
is the distribution in terms of the responsibility type. If one makes a 
distinction het\veen a duty to compensate and moral responsibility, 
then a division as a solution is more likely in the former case than in 
the latter. Partinrlarly rdcvant to the dist rihution of rcsponsihility are 
negative formulations of preventative and preservation responsihility 
as well as thl' rL·sponsihility to avoid omissions and failures, which 
seems to he more suited to be open to a regulation o f the contribu-
tional and participato1y fonn of responsihility distrihutiun. One 
should also differentiate in regard to necessary and suffü:ient condi-
tions of thc onset of consequences and damages depending on the 
failed or omitted or unintentionally neglected actions of several 
actors. 
3.3 Basic problems of responsibility distribution do not only arise 
out of the non-corporate collective action of many actors (he they cor-
porations or individuals), hut also out of specific strategic conditions, 
pa11icularly in division-of-lahour capitalist processes, that is, in lahour 
segrcgation in the market externa! to corporations. The effects. results 
ancl sicle-effccts of such actions llave - and not just nowadays - an 
increasingly explosive nature. Maybe the difficulty can he clarified with 
thc help of ex:.11nples and model hypotheses regarding o f social traps, 
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w hich until now were discussed most ly within the realm of individual 
rationaliry vs. collective irrationality (e.g., Prisoners' Dilemma, cf. 
Hardin, Lenk/ Maring 1990). 
We ali know that negative external synergetic and/ o r cumulative 
effecrs may occur when a large numher of actors act along tbe lines of 
individual need calculations (only clirectly responsibk: for their own 
interests ami acts). Particular components, that as such are relarively, 
i.e .. suhliminally. harmless, can lead as a whole to damages or evento 
the loss of high ly appreciated '·cotmnons" or public property. It is cba-
racteristic of these clamages that prope rty rights, i.e., individual rights 
to use resources. e .g. puhlic emes, are poorly or not at ali defined or 
that they are not observed at ali. Externalities are cbaracterized by an 
incongruity between that outcome for which one is actually responsi-
hlc and that for which one is made responsible Oiable). To avoid the 
externa! social costs, these results must. for example, be internali:'.'.ed -
incorporated into the 'production functions' of a business. 
Distrihution of responsihility comes in at least rwo forms - In 
regard to this prohlem two suhproblems emerge: firstly, rhe question 
of distribution of responsibility for ur in view of cumulat ive ancl syner-
getic damages and , secol1(Uy, the question of responsihility far unfo-
reseen or even enforeseeahle consequenccs. With regard to moral jud-
gemen!, ir follows from the subprohlems Lhat a personal action res-
ponsihilily in many a situation and case cannot in general he attribu-
ted to an individual agent alone nor, under many a circumstance, can 
the cause he attributed to a single domain. Not only in the sen.se o f 
task and role responsibility, but al.so in the moral and legal sense do 
the concerned indivicluals bear a co-responsibility corresponding ro 
their active. potenlial or formal participation, to their constituring or 
inlluential shares (to be determinecl in each individual case). An exlen-
sion of the responsihi lity of operationally manageable models of the 
distribution of (co-)responsibility are, cons idering the consequences of 
collective action, imperative. Appeals to the avoidance of social trap 
situations ¡tlone are not very useful. One shoulcl al.so introduce opera-
tionally available and efficient measures such as legal sanctions (pro-
cluct liabiliry, collective responsibiliry, etc.), financia! incentives to 
change production, determinat ion of prope1ty rights for public goods, 
cte. The following rule could serve as a guideline: as many laws, regu-
lations and probibitions as necessary; as much incentive, individual ini-
t iative and individual responsibility as possihle. 
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.3.4 A second and different category with respect to the prohlems 
of n.:sponsihility distrihution includes the externa] responsihility of cor-
porations. i.e .. the corporation ancl some or ali of its members (repre-
sentariw responsihility ,.s. p:11ticipa1ory responsihilityl. and corpora-
tion rnembers alune (reducible to tlll' specific types of responsibi!ity); 
interna! responsihility in different ly structured corporations (hie rar-
chies de.) as individual responsihiliry and co-responsihility: the dele-
gation of responsibility; ancl va1y ing types of responsibility. 
Moral responsihility - this is the main and leading hypothesis - is 
usually, in regard to (at leasr ideal l corporate action, clifferentiable and 
ramified: it is corporations as such, corporation members. or rhe cor-
poration and its memhers among others that can be held morally res-
ponsihle. The attribution of individual moral responsihility must be 
separately justified in each case. In general, one shoukl makc.: a dis-
tincrion hetwL'en rhe externa! (moral, legal, role) responsibi liry ofthe 
corporation~ ami the korrL'spondingl interna] responsihili ty distrihu-
tion. 
Besidc.: thL' role or task-specific. thL' legal and rhe corporative 
action responsihility. corporations ami institutions do ha'-e a moral res-
ponsihility oran accountahility analogous to moral respunsibility. This 
moral responsihility can also he unclerstood as a higher leve! respon-
sihility: il would exist in addition to ancl inclepenc!L'nt of the specific 
individual responsihilities of the individual corporation rnemher. 
Individual responsihility and corporate rL'sponsihility do not bave the 
same meaning: they cannot simply be mutually recluced to one anot-
lier. The responsihility of eme kind or type cloes not replace the other 
form. although in general. these analyticalty distinguished rnodel con-
cepts my over\ap in social reality. 
Corporations can act .. intc.:ntionally", though in a manner non-
rc.:ducible to indi,·iclual action ( i.e .. they act in the seconda1y sense, on 
a higher leve! of social fiction, on a symholic or semantically structu-
red ami interpretecl plane; their actions hecause o f this ancl the social 
consequences are no less real than a person's actions). Such a corpo-
rate responsihility. that is not equivalen! to the immediately hearahle, 
direct. personal responsibility applies to husinesses. the state and cor-
porations as wdl as to teclrnical and scientitk organizations. Until 
now. the traclitional a priori combination of the att rihution of moral 
responsihility ro natural persons, i.e., the concepts of responsihility lin-
kecl to inclividuals, appeared to he insurmountahle harriers regarding 
the attrihution of moral responsibility to corporat ions ami situations. 
ENCINEEIUNG. J\.IA 'ACEl\.IENT. AND Ell-llCS - ·1wo H ATS OR THHEE~ 
Must that be so? We think. no. Rather. the exclusive limitation to the 
individualistic modd rbwarted. Should one not rather develop a hie-
rarchical model that adequately and clifferentially puts the responsihi-
lities on the various levels? 
Making or holding corporations responsible may also constitute a 
first step of attrihuting responsihility in corporate action; the (c:orpora-
tion interna]) distribution prohlem can be dealt with in a sec:ond step. 
The latter is diffic:ult to deal \Vith according to responsibility types. The 
following working hypotbeses are formulated to address rhis poim. 
1. Only general distrihution rules can he laid down with certainty. 
2. These rules are (ideally) to he applied to each individual case 
\Vith extra provisos regarding the special conditions. 
3. The responsibility distrihution is determine<l by the structures 
of the o rganization, decision-making structures (Interna! Decision 
Units) ami principies (individual and collective instances ancl units; 
unanimity or majority principies). (This applies to the social srructure 
in general. too.) 
4. The externa! responsibility in view of third parties, society and 
for their rdevant instances. is <lependent on the corporate struccure, 
on the influence and control of individuals, on the contributions of 
(individua]) agents and in general on the interna! responsibility distri-
hution (in che sense of cornpetency and task distribution and role-
struc:ture ). 
'i. The interna] responsihiliry for the fulfilment of tasks and roles 
"\Vith rcspect to colleagues is also primarily determined by the corpo-
rate structun:. lt is primarily an accountability to superiors and a spe-
cial case of the role and task responsibility. (The ohservation of these 
duries is generally legally required, usually in form of a contraer; it can 
also he morally required.) 
6. Tasks and competencies ancl the accompanying responsibility 
can he delegaced. The responsibility of rhe delegating person cloes not 
(necessarily) end there. In general, however. moral responsibility, can-
not be delegarecl. 
7. The (normative) responsibility for che consequences of actions 
is p rimarily a result of the individual contrihutions of action ancl pro-
duction. The individual director or the Chief Executive Officer, as well 
as rhe performer or executive, would act incleed. (The performance of 
an order or a command <loes not, however, generally exculpare the 
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performc:r.) The distribution of such an externa! o r the respective inter-
na) rc:sponsibility, which assumes other responsibility distributions, 
results from the respective contribution to the action or production and 
fro m the involvement of the acto r or contrib utor. 
8. Role and task responsibility results from formal as well as infor-
mal roles ami tasks; the rc:sponsibility and its (externa) or interna!) dis-
trihution depc:nds on corporate structure, hierarchy ancl position. 
9. Moral responsihility (in a narrower sense) as simply clirectly 
and personally attrihutahlc: responsibility in view of externa! or inter-
na! adressees is made topical by its own action and possihilities of 
action. Moral responsibil ity is a function of power, influence and 
knowledge. The co-responsibiliry derermines itself corresponclingly 
with regard to the strategic placement of an individual in a corporn-
tion. It is increasing wirh growing formal authority of the bearer and 
the leve! or position within the hierarchy or corporate decision struc-
ture. The moral responsibility of A can he Jarger, smaller or equally 
large as tbat of 13. Howevcr, responsibility distribution is not suitecl to 
percentage distribution analysis; ir is better suited to comparative sta-
tements. Moral responsibil ity is nol really divisible; it is open to sha-
ring though. lt can he home solely (c:xdusivc:ly) or jointly (each per-
son fully or partly). In the distribution mo<lel of moral responsibility 
the inc.livic.luality of the attribution an<l the rnorally required non-disap-
pearance of thc co-responsibility it is necessary to take seriously the 
moral accountahility even in view of a growing numher of participants 
( which might factually tencl to minimize the personal share of the res-
ponsibility). 
10. Thc lc:gal clistribution of responsibility is dealt with separately 
according to legal or natural persons, to thc respective civil or crimi-
nal law, to legal aspects of administration or the stare or constirutional 
approaches. In this way the legal person is, as a rule, liable to third 
parties for those who act on its hehalf according to (German) civil law 
though not ( in Germany for instance ) according to the criminal law. 
Internally speaking, the corporation may have claims against natural 
pc:rsons (e.g. members). This is not the case with corporations wbich 
are not "legal persons"' according to the Gennan civil law. 
4.5 There is a further problem of the responsibility distribution 
emerging from the use of expert and information systems (cf. Lenk 
1989). Can these be responsible? Resides the "responsihility !... ] in the 
systems" (Haefner); can wc: make complex informational clecision-
making systems and expe11 systems responsible? Is that not an unno-
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ticed introduction o f irresponsihility with no one to he appointed 
guilty. an infringement or transgression of a rahoo or even a caregori-
cal mistake on the side of the analyser' 
lt is indeed meaningful and important to make computer systems 
more rdiahle. but it is not rneaningful to attribute moral trustworthi-
ness and re:-.r)()nsibility to them. Indeecl, that 'vould be ahsurd and 
sound o<ld! Computers are not moral beings, just as information sys-
tems are nor social beings. ln spite of their far-reaching social impli-
cations. human beings rnust carry thc full responsibility for the use or 
misuse of technical systems - hut which human heings? The prograrn-
·mer? TlH.: director of the computing centre? The entrepreneur? The 
politician? ... The n:sponsihil ily may, in view of the possihle far-rea-
ching implications of responsible decisions for humans, especially 
individuals. harclly seem bearable. but morally it still exists. Human 
heings cannot morally deprive themselves of their power of decision 
ancl their accounrahility , they cannot and should not cede their moral 
responsihil ity to computers and informat ion systems. (This thesis must, 
however. sti ll he esrahlished and worked out). In view of the factual 
expansion of automatecl conditioned decisions, this responsihility 
clilemma. which the participants ami the higher clecision-makers can-
not avoid. will become more and more pressing in the future. 
Iksponsihility cannot he allowed to be diluted, either in anonymity or 
under the protecrion of committees, or in the information and deci-
sion-making systems. Possibilities of a counter-reacrion exist in a hig-
her sensitization of thc responsihil ity awareness, in the development 
of a Code of Ethics for computer experts, in the interdisciplinary rese-
arch ami in an all iance in teaching and training of ali knowledge-orien-
h.:d disciplines. etc. 
4. E11f!.ÍIZl!eri11f!. Codes of f.'thics mu! the Reso/utfrm of Res¡xmsihility 
Coi(/licts 
We recorded approximately 450 Codes of Ethics or similar regula-
tions like scienrists' or engineers' oaths. The recorded cocles come frorn 
various professional organizations (mostly American), especially from 
associations ancl societies of engineers and scientists. lnitial compari-
sons and overviews indicated la rge correspondences in the 
Fundamental Principies and Canons; differences are found mostly in 
the specific Guidelines. The contents offer more o f a son of ethos of 
the respective profession than a genuine code of ethics (if "ethics" is 
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understood in the strict sense relating to u niversal moral nonns). A 
d isadvantage in respect to the applicability at least for the respective 
professions in Germany is that the codes are too strongly oriented to 
engineers as self-employed or top managers; most (Gennan) engine-
ers do not fit these categories (hut this seems to be true in the USA, 
too). A fundamental function of the Codes is the sensitization of engi-
neers, scicntists. enginel'ring unions. ancl science and technical pro-
fL--;sionals ami organizations to cthical problems ami to contlicts bet-
" een erbio; and. for example, economic goals. Fu rther possihilities of 
implementing, applying, institutionalizing and o perationalizing the 
codes should he can:fully considered and, if mc::a ningful. the improved 
Codc::s shoulcl then he installc::cl and enforced. 
Regarding professional Cueles of Ethics the following thesis can he 
presented or postulatecl (cf. Lenk 199 1 ): Professional regulations and 
rules of hehaviour such as the Codes of Ethics should not just he regar-
cled as representing the current professional ethos; comprehensive 
ethical consiclerations induding uniersal applicability and commitment, 
general social valuc::s and goals havl' also to be recognized and refor-
mulated within the Codes as somehow obligatory or effective guideli-
nes; tbe orientation to the common goocl(s) sho uld he strengthen ecl, 
various institutional controls and possibil ities of oh taining ami furthe-
ring discipl ine:: within thc:: group. corporation, organization or institu-
tion should he induded; particular notice shoulcl he given !O the ques-
tion of the structural interrelations with the market and in working life 
(in husinesses and corporations as \vc::ll as institutions), to institutional 
corporate responsihility and to moral ideals (representing virtues 
\vhich cannot be legally enforcecl, instilutionalized or controlled) . If 
the codc::s should still find stronger and increasecl ent1y inco thc:: posi-
tive law ami gain a kind of k gal status (mayhe via clauses that need 
to he:: filled in like .. good customs .. <§ 138 BGB, Gc::rrnan Civil Law)), 
thc:: chances of the realization of the endes woulcl therehy be greatly 
enhanced. hecause appeals alonc:: and susn:ptahility ami the sensitiza-
tion of the ind ividuals - especíally of dependen! employees - do not 
seem to he sufficient, as necessary as they are indeecl. Institutional 
supporting measures are also re quirecl. ll remains important to inclu-
de ethical am i moral hasic instructions in education as well as in te ch -
nological, technical :md on-the-job-tra in ing and to provide for accom-
panying measures. i.e., similarily the discussion and publication of 
case studies, to establish ethics conunittees. to design and render com-
mitting professional hippocratic oaths or analogous vows etc., ami ro 
give legal surrort for ethic:al employees under pressure, so that the 
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profi.:ssionaJ Ethics C:odes do prove not to be just pretences or inef--
fecti,·e alihi appeals that have nothing to do with real life. (Our hooks 
- 'J'eclwik 1111d Etbik ( Techno/op,y aml Rthics) (eds. H. Lenk, G. Ropohl, 
Stuttgart 1987. 2nd edition 1993), YVisse11schají 1111d Ethik ( Science and 
Etbics> (e<l. H. Lenk. Stuttga1  1991) and WirlscbaJi und Ethik 
( J:'co1w111ics cmd F.thics) kds. H. Lenk. M. Maring, Stuttgart 1992) - offer 
lots of material on this topic.) 
There is a s011 o f social traps in\'olved in abicling by or profiting 
from ethical co<les: People who follow the rules muse often deal with 
disadvantages, while thosc vvho transgress them can bene!}t from 
advantages (especially when the infringement can hc hidclen) . 
Problems of control , sanction. trust and security also arise; these can--
not be solved through cmles alone. Adclitional institt1tional measures 
are incleed necessary. 
Regarding responsibil ity conflicts in practice, there are no isolated 
solutions or suggestions for such cases; ins tead, applicability rules or 
p ractica! guidelines on an intermediare leve! should he developed. 
These rules shouk.1 differentiate, for example, between moral ideals 
(covering virtues as mentioned above) and moral (obligato1y) ruks 
(Hennessey/ Gert). A cornbination of individual ancl instimtional mea--
sures is necessary: To further ancl strengthen individual ethical com-
p etence is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient step for the d fi-
c ient solution of rcsponsihil ity prohlems and conflicts. An implemen-
tation of eth ical considerations in b\v and politics woulcl supplement 
ancl enhance this step. In particular, the codes should explicitly set 
p riorities and decision criteria, which would aid in the solution of che 
respective responsibility conflicts. 
As mentioned ahove, most engineers ancl scientists nowadays 
work as clependent employees in industry. Insofar the respective com-
pany endes, principies of management, as well as guidelines for spe-
cific johs, etc., are relevant for them. Inch endes are usually cliscussed 
in business ethics. Jn practica! job situatio ns technology-relatecl and 
science-oriented questions and prohlems are combined, so that a 
d ean-cut separation of these is neither beneficia! nor meaningfu l in 
this realrn. Responsibility for tecbnology and science (or research acti-
vity) is particularly concretized in corporate acting in an<l for busines-
ses. Therefore, business ethics and engineering ethics as well as the 
externa] responsih ility of the rescarcher are cloesly related. 
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5. Priority Rules 
In considering different types of responsibility, we will also have 
to develop priority rules. as fo r example, thar moral responsibility 
takes precedence over role-responsihility. We would like to propase 
the following 10 rules of prderence ami priority which are not syste-
matically arranged in a successive o rder a nd valid under prima- facie-
conditions (that hut exccpt the first four ones presented just is they 
may he ovcr-rulccl hy higher ancl more hinding moral ohligations). 
(The first four rules are adapted from Werhane 1985, pp. 72.) 
1. To \Veight moral rights of the n:spective individual; these m oral 
rights are non-alienahle predistributive or primordial rights overriding 
utility considerations. 
2. To seek a compromise taking into consideration interests of 
eve1yone on an equal basis; in case of an unsolvablc or scemingly 
unsolvable conflict between equally rdevant basic rights the condition 
mentioned in the dause is especially important. 
3. Only at'ter cunsidering the moral rights of each party one 
should vote for thc solution wh ich causes the least damage or maxi-
mizcs utility for ali involved parties. 
4. Only after application of ru le l., 2. and 3. utility considerations 
are to be weighted against potentia l harm. That means in gen e ral: 
Non-alienable (predistributive) m oral rights are prior to considerations 
of avoicling harm ancl damage and these latter are prior to utility con-
siderations. 
5. In practica lly unsolvahle conflicts one should look for fair com-
promises (that is for compromises which involve proximatly equ ally 
distributed or proportionally justified distributions of disadvantages 
and utilities respectively.) 
6. General (higher level) moral responsibility is to ohtain a pre-
ference over restricted nonmoral prima-facie-obligations. 
7. Universal moral responsibility genern lly takes preference over 
role and task responsibility. 
8. Direct or primary moral responsihility is usually but not always 
to be considcred prior to inclirect responsibility for remote conse-
quences. (This is true because of urgency hut should at times and in 
cases be modifiecl according to importance and impact of conseq uen-
ces and long range effectiveness.) (See also rule I 7 bdow.) 
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9. Primary ami personal moral respon sibiliry precedes the secon -
da1y or second-levd corporaie responsibility. 
10. The puhlic weal as well as "the common good" surpasses all 
other specific, special, specious and particular interests. 
11. In technical rules and regulations for applied science impor-
tanr principies of prioriry are formulated regarding safety regulations, 
e.g. Rule DIN 31.000 of the German Technical Regulation DIN expli-
citly states: "'With respect to safe design ( it is imperative that) that solu -
tion has ro be preferred for which the safety goals will be reache<l in 
a technologically meaningful way and the best economical manner. In 
case of doubt safety requirements take precedence over economical 
considerat ion." 
12. Safoty goes on top of technical-functional and economic con-
siderations (as for instance DIN 31.000 woulcl postulate). 
13. Global or continental as wdl as regional and local cnviron-
mental compatibility are to he differentiated and have ro be taken into 
account: sysrem-relevant or decisive environmental compatibility and 
usually the comparatively speaking more comprehensive compatibility 
stay in front . Sustainable development of ecosystems is particularly 
urgent on each of these levels. 
14. Urgency of ecocompatibility and sustainability (especially a 
system-decisive one) are to top economic utility. 
15. Social and human compatibility would in the case of conflict 
precede ahove environmental and nature or species compatihilities 
which are however still to be considered b y the way of reaching for 
meaningfül cornpromises. 
16. Human and social acceptahility surpass functional efficiency and 
utility. 
17. Concrete humanity and humaneness should go in front of abstract 
requirements an<l formal universal principles. 
Such rules of priorities are conducive to tracing and probably sol-
ving conílicrs between different types of responsibilities ohtaining in a 
particular actual situation of confüct. Whereas differentiating between 
the leve!.-; an<l types of responsibilities is necessa1y for the discove1y 
and iclent ification of conflicts, the rules of priorities could helpfully be 
appliecl in solving or at least rcgulating and assessing the respective 
conflict-situations and in tracing their special sources. Yet, in this realm 
much work has still to he done in the fut ure. 
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